The paper analyses regional growth and convergence in a sample of 31 Central and Eastern European regions over the period [1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002]. We find that the regional disparity has decreased in the first half of the 1990s. Thereafter it has remained stable. Almost all of the reduced disparity seems to be attributable to income convergence between countries. At the country level, on the other hand, we find no evidence for sigma-convergence. Our econometric analysis finds evidence for conditional beta convergence. The estimates indicate that structural variables like the labour participation rate and the economy's sectoral structure matter for regional growth. Additionally, they point to the role of national specific differences in the growth performance. The sources of regional disparities do not seem to differ much between the accession countries and the current EU members. From this, we conclude that the present priorities and instruments of EU regional policy equally apply to an enlarged European Union.
Introduction
Over the past ten years, the Central and Eastern European transition economies have experienced considerable rates of economic growth, exceeding those of Western European countries. After this period of economic transition and restructuring, a group of eight transition countries (together with Malta and Cyprus) is going to join the European Union in 2004.
The Eastern enlargement of the EU is widely perceived as a big challenge not only for the accession economies but also for the European Union. One dimension is the regional economic development in an EU-25. Over the past decades, regional development and, especially, the development of economically lagging regions within the European Union have been priorities of the European Commission's economic policy. With the Eastern enlargement the regional disparities will widen, thus reinforcing this policy issue. The question then is whether regional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe are going to diminish over time, and whether the Eastern European regions are going to catch up with the Western European ones.
In this context, the paper investigates the regional development in Central and Eastern
Europe. In particular, we are interested in the prospect for regional economic catch-up and convergence of the accession countries. We consider regions as small open economies. Given the dynamics induced by the liberalisation of trade and factor flows since the early 1990s, we ask whether there are discernible patterns of economic development, in particular whether lagging regions tend to catch-up with richer ones. By estimating empirical growth models, we search for structural determinants of regional growth performances.
Most empirical studies on growth and convergence in transition economies have focused on the country level (e.g. Campos (2001) , Eichengreen/ Ghironi (2001 ), Fidrmuc (2000 ). While these contributions analysed cross-sections of countries, we focus on CEEC regions. Methodologically, the paper differs from the above-mentioned contributions in that we do not only report cross-section estimates of growth equations for the period 1991-2002, but also exploit the time-series information in our data. The empirical approach is comparable to a recent contribution by Tondl/ Vuksic (2003) , who investigate regional development in a sample of 36 Eastern European regions over the period 1995 -2000 . However, whereas Tondl/ Vuksic (2003 use a growth-accounting framework and focus especially on the role of economic geography, the present paper relies on the "convergence methodology".
To give an account of the regional economic growth during economic transition, we compare the results from a cross-section of regions for the period 1991-2002 with results from two sub-periods (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and with panel estimates. We investigate the devel--2 -opment of regional gross-value added per capita and per employee and find a pronounced reduction in regional disparities during the first years of transition. Thereafter, regional dispersion has remained stable. Our empirical findings reject unconditional convergence. However, we find evidence for conditional convergence, i.e. poorer regions conditionally grow faster than richer ones. Our results further suggest that structural factors, e.g. the rate of labour participation, the share of agriculture and manufacturing in total employment, and the level of education, are relevant for the regional growth performance. We also find a strong influence of country characteristics. As a consequence, regional disparities between countries have diminished whereas, on average, they remained stable within countries. The results from splitting the sample in two sub-periods also suggest that conditional convergence is a phenomenon of the first half of the 1990s, but not of the second half. The ability of our control variables to explain the variation in income or productivity growth substantially weakens in the period 1996-2002.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a theoretical framework for convergence or divergence in open economies. In section three, we present stylised facts on regional growth and convergence in Central and Eastern Europe. Section four gives a description of our data set. Section five reports estimates for unconditional and conditional convergence equations. Section six summarises the results and draws some policy conclusions.
A Framework for Convergence and Divergence of Open Economies
Can we expect poorer economies to growth faster than richer ones, i.e. to converge in growth rates and income levels? Following neoclassical growth theory, capital mobility might be a channel for catching-up. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and decreasing marginal factor productivities, the marginal return to capital should be higher the lower the stock of capital per worker (K/L):
But for differences in total factor productivity (A), the capital will flow from economies with high capital stocks per worker to economies with low capital endowment. If cross-country differences in average labour productivity were a result of capital abundance or scarcity, one would expect capital mobility to increase labour productivity and per capita income in lagging economies. With above-average growth rates, poorer economies would finally catch up (Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1992 ) and (1995 ), Sala-i-Martin (1996 , Straubhaar (1998)).
-3 -Notice however that even the simple neoclassical growth model does not predict sample convergence towards a common level of labour productivity and per capita income. Differences in total factor productivity (TFP) imply different steady-state levels of K/L and of average labour productivity.
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In fact, empirical studies of EU regions such as Boldrin/ Canova (2001) conclude, that most of the regional income differences inside the EU-15 can be attributed to differences in TPF, and not to differences in per worker capital stocks.
The emphasis on TFP suggests that technology diffusion may be another way for poor economies to catch up with richer ones. If lagging economies are able to adapt the leader's technology, their labour productivity and income levels will increase. If furthermore the rate of technology imitation exceeds the rate of innovation at the technology frontier, poor countries will grow faster than the technology leader (Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1995 ) and (1997 ), Sala-i-Martin (1996 , Howitt (2000)). The diffusion of technology may take place via trade, migration, FDI, and the (regulated) flow of ideas. As market integration increases competition, it may also foster innovation from within the lagging economy itself.
Labour migration is a third element that theoretically may promote convergence. Gaps in per capita production reflect both differences in labour productivity and in labour market performance. Large differentials in labour incomes and in employment conditions should induce migration from low-income and high-unemployment economies to high-income and low-unemployment regions. In this sense, labour mobility might be a substitute for capital flows, lowering labour L instead of increasing capital K (equation 2.1).
If the above-mentioned factors were pushing towards conditional, i.e. TFP adjusted, convergence, perfect factor mobility should lead to instantaneous catch-up of TFP-adjusted productivity and income. On the other hand, empirical studies conclude that, if anything, the speed of convergence is limited. Open-economy models of economic convergence need to explain this result. They do so either by introducing adjustment costs or restrictions to factor mobility and technology diffusion. With adjustment costs, the investment or migration decisions follow from inter-temporal optimisation. Capital and labour flows react to differences in marginal returns only to the extent that these differences are large enough and/or assumed to persist for a certain time (see Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1995 ), Herz (2002 ), Herz/ Röger (1995 ), Shioji (2001 ). In addition, legal barriers, country risks and socio-linguistic frontiers reduce 1 Besides TFP heterogeneity, international differences in capital taxation are another reason for nonconvergence. In equilibrium, net marginal returns should be equal across economies and the condition
should be fulfilled, where r* is the world interest rate, δ is the rate of capital depreciation, and τ is the effective marginal rate of capital income taxation.
-4 -the sensitivity of capital and labour flows to differences in capital or labour marginal productivity. Credit constraint models, on the other hand, assume that the scope for credit-financed investment is limited (e.g. Barro et al. (1995) , Cohen/ Sachs (1986)). A proportion of the capital stock increase needs to be financed out of domestic savings. Therefore, the capital stock per worker does not instantaneously jump up to its long-run equilibrium. Finally, technology diffusion is rather limited too (Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1997 ), Howitt (2000 ). The successful adoption of technology requires complementary factors like an educated labour force.
Intellectual property rights protect the commercial exploitation of innovations 2 , and technology diffusion is limited and selective (Bottazzi/ Peri (2003 ), Peri (2003 ). Additionally, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for the idea that technology diffusion outpaces the rate of innovation.
Instead of converging, real growth, per capita income, and productivity levels may actually diverge. Endogenous growth theory and economic geography provide theoretical arguments or scenarios for this hypothesis. The new growth theory replaces the neo-classical assumption of decreasing marginal capital productivity by the assumption of constant or even increasing marginal returns. Therefore, capital mobility no longer implies convergence. Nondecreasing marginal returns, agglomeration externalities, better infrastructures and a better human capital endowment in advanced economies make capital flowing from poor to rich countries and not, as in the convergence scenario, the other way around (Lucas (1990) ). In a similar way, the migration from capital poor to capital rich economies may actually induce divergence. If migration is biased towards high-skilled labour, the loss of human capital in the poor regions (brain drain) more than compensates for the increase in the stock of physical capital per worker. Finally, total factor productivity positively depends on the stock of physical and human capital. Endogenous growth theory thus predicts growth rate and income divergence to be the dominant phenomenon. In addition to increasing returns to scale, economic geography models emphasize the role of the market access and of transportation costs for location decisions of firms. If the factors of production are mobile, the positive externalities from agglomeration and the importance of input and output linkages may induce a substantial geographical concentration of economic activity. The process of agglomeration can become self-reinforcing. Concerning growth and income levels, the interplay between agglomeration and increasing returns should lead regions to diverge economically.
Taken together, economic theory does not provide a clear-cut answer as to whether productivity and income growth rates tend to converge, or whether the mobility of capital and labour reinforces the existing differences. Therefore, the occurrence of conditional or unconditional convergence or the prevalence of divergence is an empirical question. Note, however, that the neoclassical growth model only predicts conditional, i.e. TFP adjusted, convergence. Factor mobility only implies productivity convergence, when the production technology is similar across countries, which is clearly not the case, or when the investment in lagging economies entails substantial flows of productive knowledge. On the other hand, Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 4) point out that also a model with a combined AK and Cobb-Douglass production function, which implies non-decreasing marginal returns to capital in the long run, can generate the periods of convergence. Equivalently, even some economic geography models imply the convergence pattern as a transitory phenomenon (Baldwin et al. (2003) ). There is thus, at least potentially, a large amount of observational equivalence. Therefore, the empirical finding of income or growth rate convergence alone does not allow drawing any conclusions about the alternative growth theories.
Patterns of Regional Growth in Central and Eastern Europe
In this section, we present some empirical evidence on productivity and income convergence for Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC). Due to data limitations, we focus on 31 Czech, Polish, and Hungarian regions (see also section 4). The following figures give a first account of the evolution of regional income and productivity dispersion and illustrate the hypothesis of unconditional convergence.
We assess the evolution of the dispersion of gross value-added (GVA) per capita and per employee, according to the concept of sigma convergence, and plot some measure of sample income variation over time (Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1995) ). During the first half of the decade, the series show a significant reduction of the sample-wide disparities. Since then, the coefficients have remained stable. Starting at the end of the 1990s, they even have slightly increased. On the other hand, the productivity and income dispersion within the three countries, on average, has remained stable over time.
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The respec--6 -tive coefficients of variation are similar to those for the EU-15 countries (which had a coefficient of variation in per capita GVA of about 0.37 in 2002, and of about 0.30 for data in purchasing power standards). Although sample-wide income and productivity inequality initially exceeded the average level of the income dispersion within the three countries by far, they have approached the average within-state disparities. Regional income dispersion within the entire sample that is more pronounced than the average dispersion within each country indicates that there exist country specific income and productivity differentials. Equivalently, the convergence of the income disparities within the sample indicates that national specific factors have become less influential for regional income differentials. Additionally, figure 3.1 also shows that per capita dispersion is slightly more pronounced than dispersion in GVA per worker. In other words, the regional income differentials exceed the differentials in labour productivity. The difference between income and productivity dispersion points to the role of regional labour market performance and demography. However, the divided by three. Using the relative average deviation from the mean as an alternative measure of income and productivity dispersion yields similar results as in 3.1.
-7 -figure also suggests that most of the regional income dispersion can be attributed to differences in average labour productivity. The overall picture that emerges from the figures 3.2 and 3.3 is a distinct negative relationship between the income and labour productivity levels, on the one hand, and the subsequent average growth rates, on the other hand. As the regions cluster in the quadrants two and four, regional productivity and income inequalities within the sample should decrease over time.
By distinguishing between the different countries, the figures reveal another interesting pattern. The overall distribution of regions within the diagram suggests sample convergence in the income and productivity levels. At the country level, however, we find no evidence that the poorer regions, on average, grow faster than the richer ones. Poland seems to be an exception. Given the small number of regions within each country, one should bear in mind that these statistical measures of dispersion, especially the coefficient of variation, are very sensitive to the presence of outliers.
-10 -plain why income divergence is limited to regions within countries. However, it is not a straightforward exercise to reconcile it with the decreasing disparities between countries.
A potential explanation for convergence between countries with a lack of convergence within countries is the importance of technology diffusion. In a situation were technology is sector specific, the productive knowledge employed may be more similar between some regions of different countries than between the regions within a country. The role of technological catch-up would then be more important between than within countries. This idea would be compatible with the finding in Bottazzi/ Peri (2003) and Peri (2003) that, although the geographical diffusion of technology is surprisingly limited, major innovations of technology leaders spread out further than minor improvements. The evaluation of this hypothesis would amount to testing for regional convergence in sector specific labour productivity. Our data on the sectoral structure of economic activity are, however, to crude for further investigation.
If, within each country, the relatively rich regions were growing faster than the relatively poor regions, and if the rich regions in the poorer countries grew even faster than the rich regions in the richer countries, we could also observe the pattern of converge within the sample but divergence within the countries. This is the argument of convergence clubs (Boldrin/ Canova (2001)). However, the figures 3.2 and 3.3 also do not deliver substantial evidence for the emergence of such convergence clubs within our sample.
Another approach is to focus on country differentials in average growth rates and on the impact of the structural characteristics of regions on their growth prospects. Country differentials in institutions and policies may either promote converge or divergence. If the country specific growth differentials vanish over time, this may provide evidence in favour of a gradually diminishing relevance or a growing similarity of the national determinants of regional development. Differences in the structural characteristics of regions, like the sector structure of production and the endowment with resources, physical and human capital, lead to differences in the aggregate productivity and thus imply differences in income levels and growth rates. This topic will be further explored in section five.
Finally, we briefly consider the catch-up of Central and Eastern Europe towards the European Union average. If the lagging regions grow faster than the EU average, the income gap is supposed to narrow in the long run. The overall picture from this section can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the overall regional disparities between the three CEEC considered have diminished over time and approached the lower levels of regional dispersion within each country.
Secondly, once we control for the initial transition recession and the timing of economic reform in the three countries, the evidence in favour of regional income and productivity convergence within the sample is surprisingly clear-cut. However, it seems that the reduction of regional income disparities within our sample has stopped in the mid-1990s. The measured dispersion is similar to the EU-15.
Thirdly, regional convergence in our sample results from convergence between countries, but there is no strong evidence for convergence within the countries. Rather the regions within countries seem to diverge. Whether one can attribute the persistence of income and growth differentials to structural determinants of long-run growth is the topic of section five.
-12 -
Data
The empirical analysis builds on data from the Cambridge Econometrics regional database, which provides comparable regional data on real gross value-added (GVA) per capita and per worker, private sector investment, employment and labour participation rates, and the economy's sectoral structure. The data are annual and cover the period from 1990 to 2002. GVA equals GDP net of taxes on and subsidies for production. We consider GVA to be the best available measure of aggregate production. Eurostat provides data on the regional level of education, which is a rough proxy for the human capital endowment.
Our data set on the CEEC only enclose the 31 NUTS 2 level regions of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Data on the regional GVA for the other accession countries are also not available from other sources. Alternatively, we could use GDP data on Central and Eastern Europe. However the data, which are available from Eurostat, only cover the period 1995-1999. Our focus on the three biggest accession economies seems justified by the economic importance of the 31 regions for the first round of Eastern enlargement. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic together accounted for about two third of the GDP and more than a half (52%) of the population of the accession countries.
Empirical Results from Growth Regressions
This section presents estimates of growth regressions for the 31 NUTS 2 regions of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The objective is to investigate, firstly, whether the data indicate a tendency for poorer regions to growth faster than richer ones, and, secondly, whether we can isolate structural parameters determining a region's long-run growth performance. The question of unconditional convergence, the convergence of regions towards common income levels and growth rates, is addressed by estimating the equation
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of income or labour productivity over the period 1991-2002. The explanatory variable, GVA per capita, is in logarithms. The intercept term captures the sample average growth rate over that period. The hypothesis of unconditional convergence predicts the beta-coefficient to be smaller than one. In such a case, poorer economies would grow faster than richer ones. The results are given in table 5.1.
-13 -In section three, we hypothesized a potentially large impact of national specific factors on the regions' average growth performance. Therefore, we add country dummies for Hungary and the Czech Republic and re-estimate equation 5.1 (see also table 5.1).
Section three further indicated that the structural characteristics of regions are likely to affect the regional productivity or income levels and growth rates.
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Because of data limitations we can only consider regional differences in the relative weight of industry, agriculture, and the service sector, but not at a finer level of sectoral disaggregation.
If structural (and national) characteristics matter, no theory would expect the regional productivity and income levels to converge towards a common level. The question then is whether similar regions converge in growth rates and productivity levels, i.e. whether conditional convergence holds. In this case, a beta coefficient smaller then one may only imply that a region converges towards its own steady state.
The structural parameters that are introduced to proxy for regional differences include the labour participation rate, the sector structure of employment, and the level of workforce education. The labour participation rate (L/N) is the ratio of regional employment to regional population. It is introduced in logarithms and supposed to have a positive impact on per capita growth. 8 The share of agriculture (AG) and the share of manufacturing (IN) in total employment are expected to negatively affect a region's growth path.
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As a proxy for the human capital endowment, the percentage of the working age population with medium and high education level should have a positive impact on growth and income levels. Except for the country dummies, the significance tests in tables 5.1 and 5.2 are thus one-sided tests. 7 E.g., a region's total factor productivity may heavily depend on its sectoral structure. Also, the role of externalities potentially differs between industries. The same holds for the scope for innovation and technological progress. Furthermore, sector specific shocks may hit regions that differ in their economic structure very differently. 8 The rate of labour participation could affect per capita growth via the following mechanism: Suppose the intercept term, α, captures the technological progress. The extent to which technological advances translate into per capita growth then depends on the participation rate. The equation , which is the classical "convergence equation" derived from neoclassical growth theory (e.g. Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (1995) ), can be
Technological progress affects the production per
The participation rate thus controls for regional differences in the propagation of technological progress into per capita income growth. As it is defined, an increase in activity among a region's population causes its participation rate to rise. However, it may also increase following net inflows of labour from other regions (commuting). 9 For a less decisive statement on the potential impact of agriculture and industry on the regional growth performance, as opposed to the income level, see Martin (1997 Standard errors in parentheses, p-values for misspecification tests Statistical significance: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
In general, regional policy is mainly interested in the evolution of per capita income, i.e. in the question of regional convergence or divergence in per capita GVA or per capita GDP. The economic theories presented in section two, on the other hand, are mainly concerned with the -16 -evolution of labour productivity, Y/L. In general, they make no statement about per capita incomes but about the production per worker. Therefore, we have also estimated equations 5.1 and 5.2 with the average annual growth of GVA per worker as the dependent variable and the average labour productivity in 1991 as an independent variable. Table 5 The regression results in tables 5.1 and 5.2 do not exploit the fact that our data set combines cross-section and time-series information. Using the panel structure potentially improves the analysis as it increases the number of observations and the variation in the variables. However, the focus of economic growth theory is on the long-term evolution of productivity and incomes. The use of data at relatively high frequency may cloud the long-term trends. In such a case, the variation in the dependent variable may be due primarily to shortrun business cycle fluctuations.
To investigate how exploiting the time-series information in our data would alter the results, we have repeated the analysis, firstly, by splitting the sample in two cross-sections for the periods 1991-1996 and 1996-2002 respectively, and, secondly, by employing panel estimation. The estimates can be found in the annexes 1 and 2. Interestingly, the cross section results indicate a statistically significant impact of (most of) the structural parameters included and of the country dummies in the first half of the decade. In the second interval, how--17 -ever, only the country dummies are statistically significant. Furthermore, our set of right-hand side variables explains a fairly high share of the variation in per capita income and labour productivity growth during the sub-period 1991-1996, whereas the explanatory power, measured by the R², is substantially weaker for the years 1996-2002. 10 Contrary to the years 1991-1996, the coefficient on lagged GVA per capita and per worker does not indicate conditional convergence neither does it suggest unconditional convergence. The panel estimates for the period 1993-2002 confirm the impact of the economic sector structure and of labour participation on the regional growth performance displayed in tables 5.1 and 5.2. The results for the level of education are much weaker than in the simple cross-section regressions. This may be due, however, to the fact that data on education are not available at the same frequency than the other variables, and thus do not vary over time.
As mentioned in section two, the different theoretical approaches to regional convergence or divergence potentially exhibit a large amount of observational equivalence. Thus, regressions like those presented in this paper do not allow deciding upon which class of models is the least inappropriate description of reality (Boldrin/ Canova (2001)). Furthermore, the critics of this type of analysis emphasize that beta-convergence regressions summarize the entire dynamics of the distribution into one single point estimate.
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However, the advantage of this approach is that, contrary to histograms or the Markov-chain analysis, it allows testing hypothesis about the impact of different economic variables on economic growth.
In general, estimates of conditional convergence equations are very sensitive to the explanatory variables included. Additionally, the number of economic indicators available for CEEC regions is rather limited. However, the finding that the rate of employment and the structure of economic activity play a role in determining an economy's growth performance coincides with results for Southern Europe (Badinger/ Tondl (1999) ) and for the U.S. (Caselli/ Coleman (1999) ). The role of human capital and of foreign direct investment for growth in Central and Eastern Europe is emphasised by Tondl/ Vuksic (2003) . From these similar findings, we derive a certain robustness of our results.
-18 -
Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of economic growth and convergence in a sample of 31 Central and East European regions, the NUTS 2 entities of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
With respect to both the gross value-added and the population the sample comprises a major part of the coming EU Eastern enlargement.
Based on our framework of convergence and divergence in open economies, we look at the growth of these CEEC regions over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . For the sample as a whole, the regional income dispersion has decreased in the first half of the 1990s. There is a tendency of poorer regions to exhibit above-average growth rates and thus of sample convergence. Since then, the reduction of income and productivity dispersion has come to a halt. The tendency for poorer regions to grow at above-average rates slowed down or even vanished. Furthermore, it seems that, over the period, regional convergence has been driven almost entirely by a reduction of country differentials. On average, we find no evidence for regional convergence within the three countries considered.
Our econometric analysis does not find evidence for unconditional convergence.
However, controlling for a number of structural indicators we find evidence for conditional convergence. The cross-section estimates of the beta coefficient are below recent estimates for the EU-15 regions. Our results also point to the importance of the country specific factors for improvements in the regional standards of living. This finding may be taken as argument for regional policy to promote countrywide growth, even if it is accompanied by greater regional inequality (Davies/ Hallet (2002) ). The graphs in section three, on the other hand, do not indicate that faster growth has been accompanied by greater intra-country divergence. The empirical evidence in this paper does thus not suggest the existence of a trade-off between countrywide growth and regional convergence for our sample.
The structural parameters in the regressions have the expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional significance levels. From our results we conclude that structural variables have an impact on regional long-run growth. Once we split the sample in two time periods, the first five years of transition seem to differ markedly from the second inter- (2001) claim that most of the regional differences in average labour productivity cannot be explained by regional differences in the capital stock per worker. In a similar way, our data do not suggest a strong univariate relation between the level of investment per employee and labour productivity growth. The apparent role of TFP is compatible with the idea that the productivity catch-up heavily depends on the reallocation of factors of production from less productive sectors to more productive activities and more efficient production processes. However, the level of sectoral disaggreation in our data set is too crude for a closer investigation on this aspect.
In general, our findings suggest that the EU does not need to develop a completely different approach for dealing with regional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe. New regions and more disparity do not necessarily require new instruments. On the other hand, the criticism on present EU regional policy would also apply in the context of enlargement. The analysis suggests that regional policy should concentrate on the reduction of unemployment and on promoting the modernisation of the economy's sector structure. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, p-values for misspecification test Statistical significance: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
Annex 2: Panel estimates
The tables A 2.1 and A 2.2 present panel estimates for the equation 5.2 in section five. The dependent variables are the logarithm of GVA per capita, in A 3.1, and the logarithm of average labour productivity, in A 3.2. Contrary to equation 5.2, the coefficient on the lagged income and productivity levels is thus β , and not T / ) 1 ( − β . The levels of GVA per capita and per employee are normalized by the respective country averages in period t and t-1. In other words, the log of GVA per capita and per worker is introduced in deviations from the country mean. Time-varying country specific effects thus become obsolete. Averaging regional in--26 -come and productivity levels by the respective country average is also a simple, though not the most sophisticated way to account for some of the (possible) spatial correlation in regional growth rates (see Rodriguez-Pose (1999) , p. 9). Half-life period (years) 6.7 6.5 4.5
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, p-values for misspecification tests Statistical significance: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
The estimation relies on data in three-year intervals (1993, 1996, 1999, 2002) . The null hypotheses for the coefficients are the same as in section five. The first two columns contain the coefficients obtained from GMM-system estimation of dynamic equations (Blundell/ Bond (1998)). As some of the right-hand side variables are potentially endogenous, GMM-system -27 -instruments them by their lagged values in levels and first differences (see Bond (2002) and Bond et al. (2001) for the details). The Sargan test is for the validity of the instruments used.
12
GMM-system requires the absence of second order autocorrelation, whereas first order autocorrelation does not invalidate the results. As the missing AR (2) values indicate, our series are too short for the AR(2) test to be conducted. The maximum likelihood-estimation, on the other hand, passes all specification tests. As the explanatory variables are not instrumented, they may, however, suffer from endogeneity bias. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, p-values for misspecification tests Statistical significance: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
